本网专译: 美国早就计划好要清除七个国家政权

[royl]

本网专译: 美国早就计划好要清除七个国家政权

译者注: 魏斯理.克拉克将军是美军退休的四星上将. 他在1997年至2000年期间, 曾任北约最高统帅以及担任联军在科索沃冲突的最高指挥官. 他曾在2004参与美国总统选举.

以下是2007年克拉克将军接受女主持人艾美.古得门访问的片段.

(主持人)艾美.古得门问: 你是否看到了为了跟伊拉克开战而铺路的重演, 也就是先炮制对伊拉克大规模杀伤性武器的指控, 媒体一窝蜂地加入?

魏斯理.克拉克将军回答: 在某种程度上, 是的. 但是, 你要知道, 历史​​不会一成不变地重演两次. 当我在2002年国会前作证时我曾警告过, 我说如果你要担心某国家的话, 这个国家不应该是伊拉克, 而应该是伊朗. 但这个政府, 我们的政府却宁愿担心伊拉克而不是伊朗.

我知道为什么, 因为我已经跟九一一之后的五角大厦(国防部)打过交道了. 大约九一一事件发生后十天左右, 我跟五角大厦全盘讨论过, 我见过拉姆斯菲尔德部长和沃尔福威次副部长. 我到楼下跟一些联合参谋部的同仁打招呼时候, 有一位将军招呼我进他办公室.
他说, "长官, 你一定要进来跟我谈一下."
我说, "你太忙啦."
他说, "不忙, 不忙."
他说, "我们已经做了决定我们将要跟伊拉克开战."
这时大概是九月二十号左右.
我说, "我们要跟伊拉克开战? 为什么?"
他说, "我不知道为什么."
他说, "我猜想他们不知道还能做些什么."
那么我说, "哦, 他们找到了萨达姆(侯赛因)跟基地组织有勾结的证据吗?"
他说, "没有, 没有."
他说, "那方面根本没有新进展. 他们只是做了决定要跟伊拉克开战."
他说, "我这么猜想, 看样子我们不晓得如何对付恐怖份子, 但我们拥有优势军队而且我们还可以瓦解政府."
他又说, "我猜想, 如果你唯一的工具是一只铁锤的话, 每一个问题都要像一根钉子."

因此, 我几个星期后又回来看他, 那个时候, 我们正在轰炸阿富汗.
我问, "我们还要跟伊拉克开战吗?"
他说, "噢, 比这个还要糟糕."
他越过他的桌子挑出一张文件.
他说, "我刚才从楼上收到这个文件" — 意指从国防部长办公室传来的文件— "今天的."
他又说, "这是一个内部文件讲述我们如何在五年之内清除七个国家政权, 先从伊拉克开始, 再来是叙利亚, 黎巴嫩, 利比亚, 索马利亚, 苏丹, 最后再把伊朗解决."
我问, "这是机密文件吗?"
他说, "是的, 长官."
我说, "那你就别拿出来给我看."

我大约在一年前遇到他, 我问他, "你还记得那件事吗?"
他说, "长官, 我没显示那个文件给你看! 没显示那个文件给你看!"


资料来源: http://www.democracynow.org/2007/3/2/ge ... ential_bid

原文:
AMY GOODMAN: Do you see a replay in what happened in the lead-up to the war with Iraq—the allegations of the weapons of mass destruction, the media leaping onto the bandwagon?

GEN. WESLEY CLARK: Well, in a way. But, you know, history doesn't repeat itself exactly twice. What I did warn about when I testified in front of Congress in 2002, I said if you want to worry about a state , it shouldn't be Iraq, it should be Iran. But this government, our administration, wanted to worry about Iraq, not Iran.

I knew why, because I had been through the Pentagon right after 9/11. About ten days after 9/11, I went through the Pentagon and I saw Secretary Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz. I went downstairs just to say hello to some of the people on the Joint Staff who used to work for me, and one of the generals called me in. He said, "Sir, you've got to come in and talk to me a second." I said, "Well, you 're too busy." He said, "No, no." He says, "We've made the decision we're going to war with Iraq." This was on or about the 20th of September. I said, "We 're going to war with Iraq? Why?" He said, "I don't know." He said, "I guess they don't know what else to do." So I said, "Well, did they find some information connecting Saddam to al-Qaeda?" He said, "No, no." He says, "There's nothing new that way. They just made the decision to go to war with Iraq." He said, "I guess it's like we don't know what to do about terrorists, but we've got a good military and we can take down governments." And he said, "I guess if the only tool you have is a hammer, every problem has to look like a nail."

So I came back to see him a few weeks later, and by that time we were bombing in Afghanistan. I said, "Are we still going to war with Iraq?" And he said, "Oh, it's worse than that." He reached over on his desk. He picked up a piece of paper. And he said, "I just got this down from upstairs"—meaning the Secretary of Defense's office—"today." And he said, "This is a memo that describes how we're going to take out seven countries in five years, starting with Iraq, and then Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and, finishing off, Iran." I said, "Is it classified?" He said, " Yes, sir." I said, "Well, don't show it to me." And I saw him a year or so ago, and I said, "You remember that?" He said, "Sir, I didn't show you that memo! I didn't show it to you!"